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I n reviewing the recent events in Iraq and the War on Terrorism vis-a.-vis the media, the one obvious question asked by all Americans today, including those 
in mili tary service, is who do the media represent . Do they represent the voice of 
the American people, or do they represent a defined elite concerned with a change 
in the political landscape in the United States? 
Recent Background to Current Contentiousness 
Two recent incidents, I believe, are indicative of the current unease between the 
military and the media and force us to reflect on who and what the media repre-
sents in their reporting on military activities. In early 2005, Newsweek, owned by 
the Washington Post Company, published a story by Michael Ishikoff claiming 
that a copy of the Koran had been flushed down a toilet by an American interroga-
tor at Guantanamo, Cuba, in front of Muslim intelViewees. When evidence was 
produced that showed it to be false. Newsweek belatedly retracted the story but only 
after much damage to the US m ilitary's image occurred in those countries with 
whom we must cooperate in the War on Terrorism.l More importantly, the rioting 
that fo llowed resulted in 16 deaths in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Newsweek, 
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moreover, wanted no part of the White House's request that it help repair the dam-
age. And, unfortunately, no journalist from any major news organization wrote 
that they should. 
The current reporting of the Haditha story also bears mentioning. The rush to 
judgment of the Marines involved by the US media without waiting until the facts 
are determined has been viewed by many as simply reflective of the media's ten-
dency to believe the worst. More significantly, the fact that the incident was re-
ported immediately to superiors by the Marines involved, that those in command 
were made aware of the civilian deaths contemporaneous with the incident, and 
that the squad involved has consistently claimed that they followed their rules of 
engagement in clearing the buildings from which they took fire, have all been con-
veniently overlooked by the mainstream media in their reporting. More impor-
tantly, there has been no investigative reporting on standard procedures for 
clearing buildings from which fire is taken and no interest in reporting the context 
in which these deaths occurred. 
What is most difficult to understand is why the press, most of whom have not 
served in the military, so often chooses to believe fo reign sources proven incorrect 
in the past, and disregard the voices of fellow Americans who are daily placing 
themselves in harm's way fo r our nation's foreign interests. Military lawyers also 
ask why the press ignores the basic legal principles that apply in irregular 
belligerencies where unlawful combatants are engaged with national forces-in 
this case coalition forces and forces of the new Iraqi government. We must also ask 
why there is such a bent to discredit and criticize US efforts rather than understand 
the rationale behind coalition actions aimed at ensuring we can "stay the course" in 
Iraq and the reasons for the immediate actions in support thereof. 
With that said, our charge must be to assess the relationship between the media 
and the military as it relates to an understanding and articulation of the legal pa-
rameters of the current conflict in Iraq as covered by the press-that is, Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Our goal should be to increase mutual understanding at both the 
personal and institutional levels of what the legal regime actually represents with 
respect to the military's operational requirements in the War on Terrorism and the 
legal framework under which the current conflict is being pursued. One would 
hope that the effort here today can help lead to practical solutions to areas of friction 
in communication between the two. Finally, our ultimate quest must be how can 
we maintain a vibrant, robust freedom of expression while protecting the nation's 
capacity to fight our wars effectively. 
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The ugal Principles Underlying Irregular Belligerencies: 
Often Ignored in the Reporting on Iraq 
The Nature of the Current Violence 
As discussed below in detail, the media's use of the now firmly ingrained term, "in-
surgents," or "insurgency," is both factually and legally incorrect and reflects the 
media's misunderstanding of the conflict. 
The Global War on Terrorism was clearly not contemplated when the four 
Geneva Conventions, addressing wars between national entities, were signed in 
1949.2 The violence in Iraq currently perpetrated by al Qaeda and elements of the 
former regime is being spearheaded by individuals under no known national au-
thority, with no command structure that enforces the laws and customs of warfare, 
and with no recognizable, distinguishing military insignia. More importantly, they 
represent no identifiable national minority in Iraq. Their attacks have injured and 
killed civilians of all ethnic groups, as well as more than 2,500 US military person-
nel attempting to assist the democratic government in Baghdad to succeed. Their 
use of children and women as lookouts and information gatherers is reminiscent of 
Vietnam and raises serious questions about the status of those individuals when 
acting on behalf of terrorist fighte rs in Iraq. The fact that this status is seldom, if 
ever, acknowledged by the press raises serious concerns for the mili tary in their ef-
forts to assure the public of our adherence to the law of war. 
It is important to understand that terrorist violence provides no legal gloss for 
its perpetrators. The critical international law principles applicable to the violence 
in Iraq are found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions in Common Article 33 relating 
to internal armed conflicts and the principles en unciated in the two Additional 
Protocols to these Conventions negotiated in 1977.4 The minimal protections af-
forded by Common Article 3, for example, include prohibitions on inhwnane 
treatment of noncombatants, including members of the armed forces who have 
laid down their arms. Specifically forbidden are "murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment," and extrajudicial executions. 
Provision must also be made for collecting and caring for the sick and wounded. 
The 1977 Geneva Protocols had their roots in wars of national liberation follow-
ing World War II. Colonial powers, to include the United States, France, Great 
Britain, and the Netherlands, had engaged these liberation movements militarily, 
often with little regard for the law of armed conflict. In the 1974 conference 
hosted by the Swiss government in Geneva, the need to regulate conflicts of a 
non-international character was addressed in Article 96(3) of Additional Protocol I 
and is the subject of Additional Protocol II. At the confere nce, the Swiss 
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Government invited members of national liberation organizations to participate, 
but not vote. 
The participation of non-State actors helped shape the drafting of Article 96, 
paragraph 3 of Additional Protocol I. This section provides that a party to a conflict 
with a State army can unilaterally declare it wants the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and the 1977 Protocols to apply. This would, of course, offer greater protection for 
members of national liberation movements. Under Article 96, however, parties 
authorized to make such a declarat ion had to establish that they were involved 
in "armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial do mination 
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of 
self-determination."5 In Iraq, however, terrorists are trying to unseat the govern-
ment that has been overwhelmingly approved by the people. Moreover, al Qaeda 
has made no statement that it desires the Geneva Conventions to apply. 
These terrorists, or unlawful combatants, however described, have no juridical 
existence other than as common criminals. Additional Protocol I, Article I con-
fli cts, or those between a nation and a recognized insurgency seeking a legal status, 
differ from the present terrorist violence in that participants in Article I conflicts 
opposing government forces are required to meet certain minimum requirements. 
These are: ( I) that they operate under responsible command and are subject to in-
ternal military discipline; (2) that they carry their arms openly; and (3) that they 
otherwise distinguish themselves clearly from the civilian population.6 In return 
they are accorded certain protections when captured. It is doubtful that those per-
petuating violence in Iraq today meet these criteria for the status of insurgent. 
Moreover, they are exploiting every ethnic group fo r their own vicious ends, with-
out regard for these requirements. 
The fact that these terrorists have no recognized and protected status under the 
Geneva Conventions or their Protocols, and employ methods completely banned 
by the laws of armed conflict, is likewise seldom articulated by mainstream report-
ers. In addition, al Qaeda's failure to adhere to the most basic tenets of interna-
tionallaw on the battlefield is never addressed. What is addressed is every claimed 
violation of the law by American service members, often responding to acts of sav-
agery by Muslim extremists claiming to act on behalf of Allah, not on behalf of a 
national or sub-national entity. The fact that these claimed violations of the law of 
war by Americans are often subsequently found to be without substance seems to 
never appear in print. 
The Status of the AI Qaeda and Other Anti-Government Participants 
While the press today insists on calling these terrorists " insurgents," the fact that 
they are the basest of criminals, and not insurgents with minimal juridical status 
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under Article I, Protocol I, as discussed above, is never recited. The fact that they do 
not represent even a significant minority of the Sunnis, Shiites or Kurds is never ex-
plained. (We know this because 70% from all sectors voted in the December 2005 
elections for a democratic government.) And there is never a call in the press for the 
Iraqi people to stand up and denounce these perpetrators of violence who are even 
now sucking the lifeblood from the fledgling Iraqi Government . 
The law of armed conflict is based largely on the distinction between combat-
ants and noncombatants. Unfortunately, in Iraq, the clear distinction normally 
witnessed in conflict (i.e., belligerents on the one hand and the civilian populace on 
the other) is significantly blurred. Nor are all elements that are perpetuating the vi-
olence today working toward the same ends. Baathist operatives within the Sunni 
elite who were formerly within Saddam's inner circle are trying to prevent the 
fledgling democracy from succeeding. The al Qaeda leadership is focused on driv-
ing the Western influences from Iraq and it is likewise targeting any supporters of 
the current coalition effort to help the new Iraqi government sustain democracy. 
Certain members of the Shiite leadership have used the turmoil as an opportunity 
to settle scores while at the same time refusing to commit completely to the new re-
gime until it is determined that it can succeed. Shiite religious leaders like Sistani 
are remaining silent. The Kurds have opted to remain on the sidelines in the north 
and take a wait and see approach while at the same time ostensibly supporting the 
new regime. Then there are the local rivalries, and in Iraq, all politics are local. I saw 
that in Fallujah in late 2004 and in early 2005 when I was there on behalf of the Sec-
retary of State. 
The point is that the Marines under scrutiny at Haditha responded to attack in a 
very complex environment. The key question had to be whether they followed the 
legally scrubbed rules of engagement and, equally important, whether the ruJes of 
engagement followed, if in fact they were followed, actually applied to the facts on 
the ground as they presented themselves to the Marines involved. Major General 
Bargewell, the investigating officer, is now carefully examining these questions on 
behalf of the Secretary of Defense. 
These cross currents, and the fact that our Marines and Army forces are dealing 
with a period of carefuJly orchestrated violence, need to be more accurately por-
trayed by the media. The fact that individuals, including women and children, who 
participate actively and directly in support of combat activities (such as providing 
combat intelligence, physically shielding combatants, etc.) themselves become 
combatants and are legitimate targets of attack, needs to be explained. That is why 
it is so critical that reporting on events such as the Haditha killings receive careful 
review and carefuJ attention. 
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Finding the Appropriate Military-Media Relationship 
We must ask then, what is the appropriate balance in reporting in the current 
struggle in Iraq? How can the media report events in a more accurate way? What 
can the military do to provide the legal insights necessary for the media to fully un-
derstand the operational legal issues that have and will arise? There is no question 
that public perceptions of the law and, more specifically, perceived violations of the 
law shape national policy decisions. This was never more true than in Vietnam, 
where the My Lai murders helped to sour the Vietnamese public on our continued 
presence there, and the US public on our continued participation in that conflict. 
In the present conllict in Iraq, the allegations concerning the alleged murders at 
Haditha and other similar incidents are even now shaping national policy deci-
sions. It was no accident that when President Bush visited Baghdad on June 13, 
2006 he met with the new Iraqi Prime Minister and expressed support for contin-
ued US presence on the one hand, while urging the Iraqis to move quickly to train 
their own forces and to take the lead in their own defense. 
There is also no question that the climate under which the military and the me-
dia operate has intensified since September 11,2001. A 2005 Gallup Poll found that 
large majorities of both the military respondents and the public believe that news 
stories about the military tend to be too negative.7 Members of all three groups, 
military, media and the public, however, believe that embedding the media within 
the operational forces enhances the public's understanding of the war, helps the 
morale of the troops, improves the public's perception of the military and im-
proves the credibility of the media coverage. It is the understanding which flows 
from embedding, not mere information, which makes the difference between fair 
coverage and something less. 
The Pradical Effects of Embedding 
It was during the Bosnian peacekeeping operation in 1995 that reporters were first 
authorized and assigned to accompany US forces as part of an authorized compre-
hensive program. This was short-lived, however, as a sensitive conversation be-
tween a commander and his men concerning racist attitudes of one of the Balkan 
parties to the conflict was reported by a Wall Street ]ounlal reporter (Tom Ricks). 
The program was robustly adopted, however, by US military commanders in Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The more than 600 reporters who were approved 
for the program received a week-long "boot camp" of sorts aboard ship and at sites 
such as Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia; Fort Dix, New Jersey; and facilities 
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in Kuwait.s New York Times journalist Andrew Jacobs found it to be "alternatively 
enlightening, entertaining, horrifying, and physically exhausting."9 
While nearly all reporters involved in the program during Operation Iraqi Free-
dom believed it gave them a greater feel for the war and a better understanding of 
the military as a result of their training and experience, there were concerns by 
publishers that negative stories by embedded reporters never caught the public's 
attention. These included stories offailed supply planning, civilian casualties, frat-
ricide and theft. I believe that this lack oftraction for negative stories can be largely 
attributed to the overwhelming success of the initial campaign and the belief on the 
part of most Americans that the coalition force had done a remarkable job, despite 
the reported negative events. 
While the embedding program was no t institutionalized during Vietnam and 
earlier, one only has to recall the excellent reporting of Ernie Pyle in the Pacific dur-
ing World War II to understand that the embedding of individual reporters has a 
long and proud history. In Vietnam, Joe Galloway, who subsequently wrote We 
Were Soldiers Once, with Major General Hal Moore, spent 25 years traveling "up 
close and personal" with military units-primarily Marine and Army infantry 
commands. It was his reporting in the Ia Drang Valley (pronounced Na Trang) in 
November 1965 with an Army Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division facing over-
whelming odds which catapulted him onto the world stage. Galloway described his 
feelings on his reporting this way: 
There, in the mud, is where war is most visible and easiest understood. There no one 
will lie to you; no one will try to put a spin on the truth. Those for whom death waits 
around the next bend or across the next rice paddy have no time and little taste for the 
games that are played with such relish in the rear. No one ever lied to me within the 
sounds of the guns.10 
The commitment by the media to embedding their reporters in Iraq has now 
waned . While at one time several hundred reporters were assigned to operating 
units, today that number stands at no more than 25. More than 40 media person-
nel, to include reporters, cameramen and assistants, have perished in attacks dur-
ing the War on Terror. When a newsperson is attacked, as has happened recently in 
the case of Bob Woodruff and others, the story becomes their injuries and their 
prognosis and not that of the American selVicemen who may have died in selVice 
to his or her nation while providing them protection . That aspect of the mili tary-
media relationship and the related reporting has not been ignored by the American 
people. 
What marked the initial success ofthe embedding process, in my view, was the 
fact that the additional experience and training provided these reporters enabled 
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them to turn the situation into an educational opportunity for their audience. 
Through their understanding of the events in the context of the operational re-
quirements of the conflict, they were less likely to resort to quick criticism, "got-
cha" reporting and wildly negative predictions. As Navy Commander Brendon 
McClane has suggested in an excellent recent article in Parameters magazine, the 
next step should be to bring trusted reporters into the operations center to gain a 
needed context for their stories. I I While this would have to be carefully tailored de-
pending on the conflict and the sensitivity of the information, one can reasonably 
conclude that reporters like Rick Atkinson, Major Garrett and Ted Koppel, with a 
long history of trust by commanders, would be likely first candidates. 
Access to the operations center would also give access to an understanding of 
the rules of engagement approved for and employed by the force involved. Rules of 
engagement, although highly classified, nevertheless provide the legal and opera-
tional roadmap for our military's response to attack, both geographically and with 
regard to weapons systems and procedures. The understanding of these approved 
operational procedures, which are trained to by our fo rces, would preclude un-
founded claims of violations, because these rules are drafted after careful review of 
the legal restrictions applicable and after a careful review of the combatant status of 
individuals engaged. When a civilian woman or child is acting as a combatant, the 
fact that the individual no longer enjoys civilian protections should be understood 
by every journalist reporting the story, even if that fact is personally distasteful. 
When a civilian family is harboring a terrorist in their house who is firing on US 
troops serving in Iraq and representing the interests of the democratically elected 
government, as is alleged to have happened at Haditha, the reporters need to know 
that the home is no longer a protected place but has become a safe haven for the en-
emy. These are the basics, but they often seem not to be within the lexicon used by 
the fourth estate. 
When we have reporters who understand the law, have good judgment and have 
integrity, their reporting tends to be clear, more accurate and in context. When 
they do not exhibit these traits, their reporting can be misleading and worse, it 
tends to frustrate the military and, as we witnessed after Vietnam, preclude an ef-
fective dialogue in future military engagements. 
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